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Most of us have experienced at some time that dreadful feeling of being used.
No more than a pawn in another’s strategic game, we feel manipulated, taken
advantage of, and somehow betrayed. It is as if in being used we are no longer
subjects, but objects of someone else’s will and intent. When others use us as means
to their ends, we feel there is no shared moral ground, no intersubjective possibility;
it is as if our very sense of who we are vanishes into the instrumentality by which
the other defines us. Paradigmatic of immorality, then, why is using others at all
useful to education?
Charles Bingham’s essay is a response to this question, and I want to thank him
for a paper that seeks to push against the boundaries of comfort that so often frame
our work. Troubling the Kantian ends-means formula through recourse to what he
calls a “pragmatic intersubjectivity.” Bingham attempts to wrest “use” out from
under its moral shadow and set it in a pragmatic light. Drawing loosely on the
pragmatic notion that educational ends are a means for further ends, Bingham puts
forth the thesis that using others ought to be “advocated in educational contexts.”
What Bingham grounds his thesis upon is the social constitution of the human
subject. The very process of becoming a subject underscores how others are “used”
in the creation of the self. He states that “meeting an other is not an end in itself. One
will only flourish as a subject if the other is put to good use.” But what does this use
look like?
Tracing a line of “anti-Kantian” thinking, through Nietzsche to Foucault to
Winnicott, Bingham asserts that these thinkers have offered alternative ways of
thinking about the subject as one who emerges in intersubjective contexts where
using others is an inherent part of our interrelationality. The Kantian call for
autonomy and its implicit stance against using people is here inverted as a call for
the usefulness of using people. Like Bingham, I am convinced of the need to explore
the use of the teacher beyond a technocratic sensibility. Bingham’s turn to Winnicott
allows for a sense of generosity to infuse the notion of use, marked as it is by a certain
vitality and playfulness. Thus I agree with the underlying principle of Bingham’s
paper, that the use of the teacher has been long-neglected and is currently in dire need
of attention in philosophical work. But in the spirit of furthering inquiry, I also want
to raise a few questions about use and its relation to Bingham’s argument for a
pragmatic intersubjectivity. How does Winnicott’s development of the term (which
is the fulcrum of Bingham’s paper) differ from its common-sense usage? And, is it
the case that what Winnicott advocates can be aligned with pragmatism, as is
suggested here? And, finally, I wonder if use can really be intersubjective?
Bingham draws on Nietzsche, Foucault, and Winnicott in order to ground his
notion of pragamatic intersubjectivity and to dispel the idea that use has no value.
Yet, the Nietzsche-Foucault line is of a quite a different nature to me than the point
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occupied by Winnicott. What drives the former’s work is the formation of subjec-
tivity and in particular the moral subject as one who is constituted by dynamics of
normativity. It is the relation of the subject to power and its circulation that maps the
course of their philosophical trajectories. Similarly, although in a different vein,
Winnicott is also not advocating an intersubjectivity in terms of relations between
already constituted subjects; rather his work is more radical in that its focus is on how
the use of objects signals the emergence of subjectivity itself.
Winnicott begins his adventure into the formation of subjectivity from the point
of view of the infant and its development. His most well-known concept of
transitional objects is the place where he attempts to work out those first fragile
engagements an infant makes with its world. Transitional objects are, for Winnicott,
the first “not-me” possessions.1 Neither wholly internal, nor wholly external, these
objects lie somewhere in an indeterminate space of transition between the subject
and the immediate life context in which she finds herself. Not locatable to a specific
“thing,” such as a teddy bear, or blanket, these objects exist only as a play between
the “me” and “not-me.” The transitional object is, for Winnicott, nothing short of a
paradox. “The baby creates the object, but the object was there waiting to be created
and to become a cathected object.”2 Moreover, he continues to depict the ineffability
of the paradox:
Of the transitional object it can be said that it is a matter of agreement between us and the baby
that we will never ask the question: “Did you conceive of this or was it presented to you from
without?” The important point is that no decision on this point is expected. The question is
not to be formulated.3
The importance of this non-formulation hinges on the unlocatability of the object.
It only exists insofar as it can be used or related to by the infant. As Barbara Johnson
notes, the object opens a space for experience.4
Winnicott makes an important distinction, however, between object-relating
and object-using. In object-relating the subject invests herself in the object, largely
through projection and identification, and in effect creates an object for her self.
Through this, the subject begins the work of crafting a self, and, in addition, the
object becomes meaningful for the subject. Yet, as Alice Pitt observes, “the work of
creating objects is the work of a subject in isolation even though the objects that
surround the subject are involved. A more fulsome practice of self-fashioning
requires a move from creating objects to finding them already there.”5 Object-use,
then, occurs on a different register; and it is object-use, as opposed to object-relating
that allows for the flourishing of healthy development. As Winnicott writes, “the
object, if it is to be used, must necessarily be real in the sense of being part of shared
reality, not a bundle of projections.”6 Thus, the real difficult work of subjectivity
comes from learning to make use of what is already there; creating spaces of
experiences through objects that exist also independently from the self. The subject,
then, requires separation from the object as well as recognition that the object will
survive its aggression.
The using of the object, then, may be characterised as the subject’s attempt to
learn from the object, and in learning recognizes that the “real” desires of the mother
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(or teacher) exist independently from her own and uses this difference as the basis
of creating a self. “The object’s own properties operate like a third in the relation
between baby and object — a third that makes it possible to experience the world,
a third composed of the interaction itself.”7 This emphasis on the interaction itself
as being important to object-use means that there are ways in which the object (in
the figure of the caregiver) has a role to play in facilitation of the subject’s
experience. How can the mother (or teacher) be of use to the infant (or student)? This
is an entirely different question it seems to me than worrying about whether one is
being used. As Johnson pointedly remarks, “willingly playing the role of the thing”
is quite a different matter from the exploitation and use of people which arises in the
context of power relations.8 Even though mothers and teachers do have differential
power, it is precisely because of this power that they can allow themselves to be used
in ways that are productive for the child’s development. Pitt claims that
it is the survival, i.e., the non-retaliation, of the mother/analyst/teacher that allows the child/
analysand/student to begin to tolerate and even enjoy living in a world where words do not
mean what you want them to and where other people exist whose desires oppose your own.9
Object-use, then, requires nourishing what Winnicott calls a “holding environ-
ment,” a space where the subject can encounter risk without fear of reprisal in the
form of a withdrawal of love (in the case of the mother) and of concern (in the case
of the teacher) even as the mother or teacher may be angry, disappointed, or annoyed.
Thus Winnicott’s idea of what is “good enough” is not about the perfection of the
mother/teacher, as Bingham rightly claims, but about the capacity to find ways of
being used.
With this said, then, my conclusion differs somewhat from Bingham’s. In my
view, using others cannot become an “ought” of education, turning it into an
imperative for student agency. The important thing to remember about using others
is that we do so from what is given to us. The whole point is that we need to recognize
the difficulties and ambivalences in our relationships in ways that acknowledge both
our own complicity and the independent nature of another’s desires. Hence I
question whether there can be a pragmatics of use. In suggesting that students choose
their teachers might we also be encouraging a form of object-relating that does little
to help students move beyond their own narcissistic shells? The real question for me
is how do teachers facilitate object-use as opposed to object-relating? Being good
enough not only means giving up on the ideal of perfectibility but also learning about
how to read classroom dynamics less narcissistically (for example, not all student
reactions are due to how great or lousy we are as teachers). But most importantly it
requires us being able to tolerate being used by students, a position that seems to
demand, in its turn, both acceptance and trust — and a willingness to play.
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